MemPol: Polling-Based Microsecond-Scale Per-Core Memory Bandwidth Regulation Alexander Zuepke^{1*}, Andrea Bastoni¹, Weifan Chen², Marco Caccamo¹, Renato Mancuso² 1*Chair of Cyber-Physical Systems in Production Engineering, Technical University of Munich, Boltzmannstraße 15, 85748 Garching, Germany. Cyber-Physical Systems Lab, Boston University, 665 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215, USA. *Corresponding author(s). E-mail(s): alex.zuepke@tum.de; Contributing authors: andrea.bastoni@tum.de; wfchen@bu.edu; mcaccamo@tum.de; rmancuso@bu.edu; Abstract In today's multiprocessor systems-on-a-chip (MPSoC), the shared memory subsystem is a known source of temporal interference. The problem causes logically independent cores to affect each other's performance, leading to pessimistic worstcase execution time (WCET) analysis. Memory regulation via throttling is one of the most practical techniques to mitigate interference. Traditional regulation schemes rely on a combination of timer and performance counter interrupts to be delivered and processed on the same cores running real-time workload. Unfortunately, to prevent excessive overhead, regulation can only be enforced at a millisecond-scale granularity. In this work, we present a novel regulation mechanism from outside the cores that monitors performance counters for the application core's activity in main memory at a microsecond scale. The approach is fully transparent to the applications on the cores, and can be implemented using widely available on-chip debug facilities. The presented mechanism also allows more complex composition of metrics to enact load-aware regulation. For instance, it allows redistributing unused bandwidth between cores while keeping the overall memory bandwidth of all cores below a given threshold. We implement our approach on a host of embedded platforms and conduct an in-depth evaluation on the Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102, NXP i.MX8M and NXP S32G2 platforms using the San Diego Vision Benchmark Suite.

047 048 Keywords: real-time system, multi-core, memory bandwidth regulation, feedback control

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052 1 Introduction

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054 055 056 057 058 059 060 061 062 063 064 Homogeneous multi-core systems became mainstream in the real-time embedded community about a decade ago. From a predictability standpoint, these platforms came with formidable challenges that have been the focus of a host of research works [\(Lugo](#page-39-0) [et al.,](#page-39-0) [2022\)](#page-39-0). But in many ways, such systems are already obsolete. Modern embedded multiprocessor systems-on-a-chip (MPSoC) embrace heterogeneity. This is necessary due to the increasing adoption of data-intensive artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms in embedded and safety-critical domains. CPUs, GPUs, TPUs, on-chip programmable logic (FPGA), and smart network interfaces (NICs) are some examples of top-tier processing elements in current-generation MPSoCs. Xilinx's UltraScale+ and Versal [\(Xilinx,](#page-42-0) [2024b](#page-42-0)[,a\)](#page-42-1) or NVIDIA's Jetson AGX Xavier and Orin [\(NVIDIA,](#page-40-0) [2024b,](#page-40-0)[a\)](#page-40-1) are among the most recent examples of this trend.

065 066 067 068 069 070 071 072 Unfortunately, the explosion in heterogeneity has exacerbated the existing challenges related to the management of shared memory hierarchy resources. One such challenge is quality of service (QoS) driven regulation of main memory bandwidth consumption from heterogeneous processing elements (PE). Software regulation of the memory bandwidth based on monitoring of performance counters (PMC) has received significant attention [\(Yun et al.,](#page-43-0) [2013;](#page-43-0) [Yun et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016\)](#page-43-1) thanks to its wide applicability to a broad range of MPSoC that are normally equipped with performance counter units (PMU).

073 074 $075\,$ 076 077 078 079 080 081 082 083 084 PMC-based regulation, however, comes with important compromises. Most prominently, it is inherently CPU-centric, because it relies on the ability to install and process PMC-generated interrupts. Secondly, by design, it does not allow to implement complex regulation policies accounting for both per-PE activity and global system behavior. Worse yet, it is challenging to define complex software regulation policies that account for more than a single performance metric. This contrasts with the wide range of performance metrics exported by modern platforms at multiple levels of their complex memory hierarchy—e.g., at the level of PE [\(ARM,](#page-36-0) [2016a;](#page-36-0) [Xilinx,](#page-42-0) [2024b\)](#page-42-0), interconnect [\(ARM,](#page-36-1) [2016b\)](#page-36-1), and memory controller [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020;](#page-42-2) [Saeed et al.,](#page-42-3) [2022\)](#page-42-3). Third, it forces to integrate additional system-level software components at the OS [\(Yun et al.,](#page-43-0) [2013\)](#page-43-0) or hypervisor level [\(Modica et al.,](#page-39-1) [2018;](#page-39-1) [Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020\)](#page-42-2), with the corresponding engineering and performance overheads.

085 086 087 088 089 This paper stems from the question: Can memory bandwidth regulation be enforced following a drastically different approach? And, ideally, one that can achieve finegrained regulation, acceptably low overheads, and customizable regulation policies capable of capturing multiple nuances in the performance of complex memory hierarchies.

090 091 092 In light of this goal, we propose $MemPol$: a novel approach for memory bandwidth regulation that targets the aforementioned objectives. By exploiting the heterogeneous computing elements of MPSoCs, MemPol adopts a low-overhead, polling-based design

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a combination of local and global bandwidth consumption. By instantiating MemPol

139 140 with legacy policies, we also compare its performance overhead with state-of-the-art PMC-based regulation.

141 142 143 144 145 146 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sec. [2](#page-3-0) discusses limitations of Mem-Guard designs and proposes alternatives. Sec. [3](#page-6-0) presents the new regulator design, and Sec. [4](#page-12-0) its implementation. Sec. [5](#page-16-0) assesses the sustainable bandwidth on our platforms and derives parameters for MemPol regulation. Sec. [6](#page-23-0) evaluates MemPol and compares to the state-of-the-art. Sec. [7](#page-33-0) discusses related work, and Sec. [8](#page-35-0) concludes.

147 2 Background and Motivation

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149 150 151 152 This section summarizes the key aspects of PMC-based regulation—with focus on its most common variant, MemGuard [\(Yun et al.,](#page-43-0) [2013;](#page-43-0) [Yun et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016\)](#page-43-1)—and details the most important limitations of the approach that constitute the motivation for our search for a different approach to memory bandwidth regulation.

153 154 155 156 157 158 159 MemGuard regulates the maximum number of memory transactions that cores are allowed to perform over a pre-defined period of time (i.e., their memory bandwidth). Cores are assigned a memory budget that is consumed when cores perform memory transactions and that is periodically replenished. Cores are idled when the budget is depleted. Its implementation relies on three main features: (1) a memory bandwidth monitor; (2) a mechanism to deliver regulation and replenishment interrupts; and (3) a mechanism to idle cores.

160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 Memory bandwidth is monitored using performance counters. Depending on platforms capabilities, implementations of MemGuard have used PMCs from cores' PMUs [\(Yun et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016;](#page-43-1) [Schwaericke et al.,](#page-42-4) [2021\)](#page-42-4) or from the DRAM memory controller [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020;](#page-42-2) [Saeed et al.,](#page-42-3) [2022\)](#page-42-3). Since overutilization of memory controllers is detrimental to predictability [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020\)](#page-42-2), hard real-time systems dimension the memory budget allowed for regulated cores using the principle of maximum sustainable bandwidth. That is the maximum bandwidth that a memory controller can sustain under worst-case memory workload, e.g., row misses in the same bank, without experiencing overutilization (see Sec. [5\)](#page-16-0). When DRAM controller performance counters are not available, determining this value requires know-how of the target platform and non-trivial experimental setups [\(Serrano-Cases et al.,](#page-41-4) [2021;](#page-41-4) [Schwaericke et al.,](#page-42-4) [2021\)](#page-42-4).

172 173 174 175 176 177 MemGuard relies on the capabilities of the PMU to deliver a regulation interrupt to a core upon budget depletion. When such an interrupt is received, the core idles by either scheduling a CPU-intensive high-priority task [\(Yun et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016;](#page-43-1) [Saeed et al.,](#page-42-3) [2022\)](#page-42-3), or by stalling the core at the hypervisor level [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020;](#page-42-2) [Schwaericke](#page-42-4) [et al.,](#page-42-4) [2021\)](#page-42-4). One timer interrupt periodically replenishes the budget and possibly unblocks the regulated core.

178 179 180 181 182 183 Note that regulation at hypervisor level can only provide a coarse regulation at core level, while regulation at OS level can enable more fine-grained regulation at task level. However, the latter also requires changes to the operating system. Although MemPol could be extended to achieve tighter integration with the operating system and enable per-task regulation, in this work, we focus on the lower-level mechanisms

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185 186 to implement bandwidth regulation, and assume per-core regulation. We defer further integration with the OS to future work.

2.1 MemGuard Limitations

Interrupt overheads. MemGuard delivers interrupts to a core to signal both regulation and replenishment. Such an interrupt-based approach generates an overhead that increases with the frequency of the interruptions, i.e., with shorter replenishment periods, or with smaller budget assignments. Interrupt overheads pose severe constraints on the enforcement of both small memory budgets and short regulation periods.

Fig. 1 Impact (slowdown) of MemGuard's timer and regulation overheads on a memory-intensive application as a function of the replenishment period. Implementation on Linux on the Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 [\(Xilinx,](#page-42-0) [2024b\)](#page-42-0). Results are in line with other work [\(Yun et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016;](#page-43-1) [Saeed](#page-42-3) [et al.,](#page-42-3) [2022\)](#page-42-3) and extended beyond 100 µs.

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216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 As an example, Fig. [1](#page-4-0) reports the overheads of timer and regulation interrupts in our setup for the version of MemGuard that we have used in our experimental compar-ison (see Sec. [6\)](#page-23-0). The figure shows the slowdown of a memory-intensive application^{[1](#page-4-1)} as function of the replenishment period. The budget is measured as the number of L2 cache refills. Fig. [1](#page-4-0) separately shows the impact of timer *and* regulation (PMU) interrupt, and timer interrupts only. As shown, for short regulation periods $(32 \text{ }\mu s)$, MemGuard is affected by extremely high overhead—up to 2.4 slowdown ratio. These effects are in-line with previous studies [\(Yun et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016;](#page-43-1) [Saeed et al.,](#page-42-3) [2022\)](#page-42-3) that have shown around 10% overheads for periods of around 100 μs .

Inherent pessimism. Although interrupt handlers normally have minimum memory footprint, they generate memory transactions that are reflected in the very same metrics monitored by MemGuard. Precisely accounting for this interference is complex, resulting in pessimistic worst-case bandwidth thresholds.

¹bandwidth from the IsolBench testsuite [\(https://github.com/CSL-KU/IsolBench\)](https://github.com/CSL-KU/IsolBench).

231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 Single monitoring dimension. To reduce implementation complexity and the number of interrupts, MemGuard monitors only one memory consumption metric— e.g., cache write-backs, cache refills, or memory controller utilization—at a time.^{[2](#page-5-0)} Store instructions on the cores result in higher memory controller utilization than load instructions, because they cause write-backs. Therefore, if only cache refills are monitored, the worst-case scenario consists of a 1:1 ratio between refills and writebacks [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020\)](#page-42-2). But assuming so leads to overall memory under-utilization. At the same time, regulation only based on cache refills might not correctly take into account write-heavy phases that do not generate linefills (see Sec. [6.2\)](#page-26-0).

240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 Coarse regulation. Access to memory often results in bursts of cache refills and transactions. To avoid excessive idling of regulated cores and to smooth out the impact of such bursts, MemGuard's budgets and periods must be set to relatively large values. Although beneficial to reduce the impact of interrupt overheads, regulating over large periods results in prolonged memory bursts [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020\)](#page-42-2) and in an uneven distribution of memory bandwidth within the period. This complicates the adoption of, e.g., automotive techniques [\(Moon et al.,](#page-40-2) [2021\)](#page-40-2) that use offsetting to distribute the peak load of read-execute-write [\(Hamann et al.,](#page-38-0) [2017;](#page-38-0) [Pellizzoni et al.,](#page-41-5) [2011\)](#page-41-5) workloads over successive periods. Moreover, as mentioned in Sec. [1,](#page-1-0) it can cause accelerators to receive less bandwidth than their assigned quota.

251 2.2 An Alternative Regulation Design

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253 254 255 256 257 Interrupt overheads and a non-flexible single-dimension monitoring lead to severe compromises for MemGuard-based systems. In particular, regulating using core-managed interrupts—either for polling [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020;](#page-42-2) [Saeed et al.,](#page-42-3) [2022\)](#page-42-3) or regulation [\(Yun](#page-43-1) [et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016;](#page-43-1) [Bechtel and Yun,](#page-37-0) [2019\)](#page-37-0)—cannot eliminate the overheads reported in Fig. [1.](#page-4-0)

258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 An alternative to avoid interrupting useful computation on the regulated cores is to exploit the heterogeneity of MPSoCs and monitor the PMU counters from outside the core cluster, $e.g.,$ using one of the many real-time cores available on such platforms. However, while, e.g., on Arm platforms, per-core performance counters are also accessible from outside of a core (see Sec. [4.2\)](#page-13-0), per-core PMU interrupts can only be delivered to other cores on the same complex.[3](#page-5-1) Currently, therefore, the only suitable design to perform PMC-based regulation from the outside is to combine polling of PMU counters with a control action to throttle $(i.e., id$ le) the cores. To fully prevent interrupt overheads, the control action should also be done from the outside and must not involve any type of notification to the to-be-regulated cores. Furthermore, a pollbased design enacts the simultaneous use of multiple performance counters to perform regulation, while keeping overheads constant.

270 271 Sec. [3](#page-6-0) presents MemPol, a poll-based regulation design that operates from outside the cores and regulates multiple monitoring dimensions with low overhead.

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²⁷³ 274 2 In [Bechtel and Yun](#page-37-0) [\(2019\)](#page-37-0), cache refills *and* write-backs are considered in separated regulations, but their memory contributions cannot be combined together.

²⁷⁵ ³For GICv3-based systems, Arm recommends using local PPI interrupt 23.

3 MemPol – Regulation from Outside the Cores

Fig. 2 MemPol architecture. Applications cores c_0 to c_3 are regulated by an external controller logic that accesses the application cores' PMU counters as memory-mapped devices and that halts the cores via their debug interfaces.

The first objective of MemPol is to remove any overheads from the cores to be regulated. This is achieved with a design that operates *from the outside* of the target cores and specifically (1) monitors the last-level cache (LLC) activity by polling the cores' PMU counters, and (2) uses a core-independent interface (e.g., the CoreSight debugging interface, see Sec. [4.2\)](#page-13-0) to halt cores when they exceed their given memory budget. The controlling logic of MemPol can be implemented on one of the application cores, on a smaller companion core, e.g., Cortex-M and Cortex-R cores, or even in an FPGA. Fig. [2](#page-6-1) presents the architecture of MemPol.

 The second objective of MemPol is to enable a multi-dimensional regulation based on the combined contribution of multiple PMU counters, without impacting overheads. In particular, we consider the *accumulated read and write activity* of a core, *i.e.*, the sum of last-level cache misses and write-backs (Sec. [3.1\)](#page-7-0). Since the controller polls PMU counter values, within a polling period, cores can generate a high number of transactions—thus potentially overshooting their assigned budget—that can be only accounted for in the next polling instant. To contrast overshooting effects, MemPol has a short polling period P in the *microsecond* range (Sec. [3.2\)](#page-8-0).

 Compared to *MemGuard, MemPol* realizes a different regulation logic that *does* not periodically replenish cores' budgets. Instead, regulation is enacted every polling period P via an on-off controller logic (Sec. [3.3\)](#page-8-1) that can idle cores for time intervals as short as P . As programs show different behavior during their execution, *i.e.*, memoryintensive phases vs. computation-intensive phases, we limit the burstiness of memory accesses using both a sliding window method (Sec. [3.4\)](#page-9-0) and a combined strategy to

account for non-memory-intensive phases (Sec. [3.5\)](#page-9-1). Overall, cores can experience multiple on/off transitions during the length R of the sliding window, but can also idle for periods longer than R due to overshooting under small bandwidth-regulation

 Fig. 3 Comparison of the regulation behavior of MemPol (polling at 6.25 µs, sliding window size µs) and MemGuard (regulation period 1 ms) on ZCU102 regulating a worst-case memory reader at 50% sustainable memory bandwidth. In both cases, PMU counters are sampled every 6.25 µs. For MemPol, the average over 200 us is also shown for better visualization of its resulting regulation. In the given example, both mechanisms achieve the same regulation results over longer time spans. MemPol just regulates faster.

 As an example of the low-overhead, high-resolution capabilities enabled by the MemPol design, we implement two regulation strategies that operate at microsecond scale: (i) a *local per-core controller* that regulates a core's memory bandwidth $w.r.t.$ a given local per-core budget independently for each core, and (ii) a global controller that redistributes unused bandwidth to demanding cores, but keeps the overall bandwidth of all cores below a given global budget (Sec. [3.7\)](#page-12-1). Contrary to the complex interactions among cores that would be needed to realize a global controller under *MemGuard*, our global controller relies on the poll-based regulation and only requires minimal additions compared to the local one. Fig. [3](#page-7-1) gives an overview of the fine-grained actions performed by MemPol in comparison to the coarse-grained ones used by MemGuard. (See Sec. [6.1](#page-24-0) for details.)

 3.1 Regulation Cost Model

 Assuming a system comprising a set of cores C , we model a core c_i 's performance counters for read and write accesses as functions over time $PMU_i^r(t)$ resp. $PMU_i^w(t)$, which return non-decreasing integer values that relate to memory accesses. We introduce the coefficients α_r and α_w to account for different impacts that reads and writes

369 370 371 have on the saturation level of the memory subsystem.^{[4](#page-8-2)} We then sample the PMC values every P time units and aggregate the memory activity as a monotonic function $A_i(t) = \alpha_r PMU_i^r(t) + \alpha_w PMU_i^w(t).$

372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 The memory bandwidth that can be extracted from the memory controller highly depends on the memory access patterns and can deviate between best-case and worstcase scenarios by an order of magnitude or more (see Sec. [5\)](#page-16-0). Previous experiments have shown that in best-case conditions like linear memory accesses the cores are the limiting factor, while in worst-case conditions like continuous row-misses the memory controller becomes a bottleneck [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020\)](#page-42-2). Given our real-time focus, the cost model for regulation is based on the sustainable memory bandwidth $B_{sustainable}$, i.e., the minimum bandwidth that can be extracted by all cores in parallel in worstcase scenarios. We can therefore assign a fraction of the sustainable bandwidth to each core c_i as B_i , $\sum_{j \in C} B_j \leq B_{sustainable}$. The maximum allowed number of aggregated accesses to stay within the budget limits during time P is $A_i^{budget} = B_i * P$.

3.2 Overshooting

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386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 In *MemGuard*, the PMU triggers an interrupt whenever a core exceeds its budget. Instead, a polling controller samples PMCs periodically and can only detect budget overruns for the previous period P . This might results in overshooting the target budget. Under real-time constraints, overshooting is even exacerbated. In fact, the regulation is based on the sustainable worst-case bandwidth and not on the real memory utilization at the memory controller, which can handle peak best-case bandwidths much higher than the ones used for regulation $(e.g.,\,sec\,5)$ $(e.g.,\,sec\,5)$. We characterize the peak bandwidth that can be accessed by a single core as $B_{peak-core}$ and use the factor $\beta = B_{peak-core}/B_{sustainable}$ to express overshooting in relation to $B_{sustainable}$. We further use the factor $\beta_i = B_{peak-core}/B_i$ to describe the overshooting of a core c_i in relation its configured bandwidth target B_i .

397 398 399 400 401 402 403 A second contributing factor to overshooting is delays in the control path between observing that a core has exceeded its bandwidth budget, sending a halt request to the core, and the point where a core actually stops issuing further memory requests. We denote this delay as D and assume that the core stops in reasonable time $D \leq P$ within the polling period P (see Sec. [4.3\)](#page-14-0). The product $2\beta_i$ then describes the worstcase overshooting when a core c_i accesses memory at peak bandwidth and exceeds its budget at the beginning of P, but takes to the beginning of the next period to halt.

3.3 On-Off Controller as Bandwidth Limiter

406 407 408 409 410 411 To regulate a core c_i at time $t > t_0$, MemPol derives a set-point $sp_i(t, t_0) = A_i(t_0) +$ $\lfloor \frac{t-t_0}{P} \rfloor A_i^{budget}$ based on the core's memory accesses A_i at time t_0 and its configured budget. Using an on-off controller, *MemPol* halts a core if $A_i(t) > sp_i(t, t_0)$, and let the core run (again) if $A_i(t) \le sp_i(t,t_0)$. At each P, the core's set-value budget is increased by A_i^{budget} .

⁴For example, in flash memory, reading is much faster than writing.

 3.4 Sliding Window Technique to Control Burstiness

 Fig. 4 Sliding window technique. At time $t=8$, the burst (yellow gradient) is within a previous budget gradient from time $t=0$ (green gradient), but not within the current budget gradient at the start of the sliding window at time $t=5$ (blue gradient). Based on its recent history in $(t - wP, t)$ (red box), the core will be rate-limited for at least two periods in $(t, t+2)$. See Sec. [3.4.](#page-9-0)

 Real-time programs tend to access memory in burst. For example, after long idle or computation phases with few memory accesses, a program might access data again to prepare for the next iteration. The yellow gradient line in Fig. [4](#page-9-2) depicts such a burst. Since the on-off controller from Sec. [3.3](#page-8-1) uses as point of reference $t_0 = 0$, it includes the non memory-intensive phase (green gradient line in Fig. [4\)](#page-9-2) of the core. This would allow the core to run and access memory even during the burst at time $t = 8$, which is instead potentially detrimental for the real-time guarantees of other cores.

 We therefore cap the budget of a core by "forgetting" the core's unused bandwidth and limit the core's burstiness with a sliding window of w polling periods. At time t , we use $t - wP$ as start of the window, and derive a new budget gradient (the blue gradient line in Fig. [4\)](#page-9-2). We then move the window to the right each polling period (the red box in Fig. [4\)](#page-9-2).

 3.5 Resulting Combined Control Strategy

 MemPol's controller combines the strategies from Sec. [3.3](#page-8-1) and Sec. [3.4](#page-9-0) depending on the behavior in the previous w polling periods.

 Not rate-limited. A sliding window (Sec. [3.4\)](#page-9-0) tracks the behavior of a core c_i if at time t is has not exceeded its budget wA_i^{budget} for at least the last w polling periods. In each period P , the reference point t_0 of the budget gradient is moved to the current

 start of the sliding window.

 Rate-limited. The first time core c_i exceeds its given budget wA_i^{budget} at time t, the reference t_0 of the sliding window is *frozen* at $t_0 = t - wP$, and the on-off controller

(Sec. [3.3\)](#page-8-1) regulates c_i until its budget returns below the budget gradient rooted in t_0 for at least w polling periods.

Alg. [1](#page-9-3) presents the resulting controller implementation, which stores in $hist[]$ the last w values of $A_i(t)$ and tracks in t_{lrt} (aging counter) the last time that the budget was exceeded. t_{lrt} also defines the current control mode $(0..w - 1$ rate-limited, w not rate-limited). While in rate-limited mode, the variable spv_{lrt} tracks the set-point value of the budget gradient.

 The controller starts in not rate-limited mode and initializes the history data with current PMC values (Lines 6–9). In each iteration of the control loop, a current setpoint value spv is calculated depending on the current controller mode. In rate-limited mode, the controller ages t_{lrt} and derives spv (Lines 11–13) from the variable spv_{lrt} set at the start of rate-limiting (Line 21). Otherwise, spv is set to the history value at the start of the sliding window (Line 15). Afterwards, the controller samples the current

 PMC value (Line 17). If the PMC value is above spv, the controller enters rate-limiting mode (Lines 20–23): it sets $t_{lrt} = 0$ to keep the controller in rate-limited mode for at least the next w loops and it throttles the core. The current spv is copied into spv_{lrt} and defines the base for further budgeting. spv is also stored in the history data to keep the burst bounded. Once active, if rate-limited mode is entered multiple times, the budget gradient established by spv_{lrt} remains constant. When PMC values drop below spv, the controller resumes the core and updates the history data (Lines 24–26).

3.6 Setting Regulator's Budgets

10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% Blocking Time [µs] Blocking Time [µs] 0 5 10 15 20 Overshooting Factor at 6.25 µs Polling Period

 Fig. 5 Overshooting in relation to $B_{sustainable}$ by a certain factor (x axis) and the resulting blocking time (y axis) for different bandwidth levels $(\%)$ in a regulation at 6.25 µs. Lower bandwidth levels observe higher blocking times. The maximum observed overshooting in relation to $B_{sustainable}$ on the ZCU102 is factor 8.46 (dotted vertical line), see Sec. [5.2.](#page-18-0)

 Under $MemPol$'s regulation strategy, the amount of time that a core c_i is throttled depends on "how-much" it overshoots its budget B_i , which is accounted for in β_i . The resulting worst-case blocking time of c_i is therefore $2\beta_i P$. Fig. [5](#page-11-1) visualizes such blocking times as function of the overshooting factor normalized to $B_{sustainable}$. For example, if core c_i overshoots $B_{sustainable}$ by factor 10 $(B_{peak-core} = 10 \times B_{sustainable})$ and has an assigned budget B_i of 10% of $B_{sustainable}$, it will be halted for at least 100 polling periods. With a polling period of 6.25 µs, as used in our regulation on the ZCU102 (see Sec. [5.2\)](#page-18-0), this corresponds to 625 µs blocking time. The maximum overshooting factor normalized to $B_{\text{sustainable}}$ observed in our experiments was $\beta =$ 8.46 on the ZCU102 (see Sec. [5.2\)](#page-18-0), 11.08 on the i.MX8M (see Sec. [5.3\)](#page-20-0), and 6.51 on the S32G2 (see Sec. [5.4\)](#page-21-0).

 Under *MemGuard* regulation instead, the blocking time is constant and upperbounded by the length of a replenishment period. In practice, though, the blocking time of MemGuard can be even higher than MemPol's, since the typical regulation period of MemGuard is 1 ms.

3.7 Combined Local Per-Core and Global Regulation

554 555 556 557 558 559 The logic presented in Sec. [3.1–](#page-7-0)[3.5](#page-9-1) implements *local per-core controllers* that are independent of each other. However, the polling-based regulator can be easily extended to implement a global controller that uses the same regulation logic, but observes the sum of the memory accesses of all cores and the sum of all budgets. We note that, contrary to MemGuard-based regulation, the global controller can be implemented alongside the local one and does not require complicated interaction among cores.

The global controller overrides a per-core controller decision only if the previous bandwidth demand of all cores was below the configured budget. Additionally, the global controller updates per-core controller's t_0 to t , thus forcing cores to acknowledge the actual used bandwidth and preventing penalties due to the overriding forced by the global controller. The redistribution scheme stops as soon as the bandwidth demand increases.

3.8 Regulator Sliding Window Size Settings

The regulation model allows for different sliding window sizes w and bandwidth settings B for the per-core and the global controller. An assignment is valid as long as $w_{global} \leq \max_{j \in C} (w_j)$ and $\sum_{j \in C} B_j \leq B_{global}$.

Setting per-core w_i value is particularly sensitive to the burstiness of applications executing on core c_i . Although an actual value should be derived from the temporal behavior of the regulated applications, Sec. [3.4](#page-9-0) hints to the possible compromise of limiting the budget during a burst to $w_i A_i^{budget}$, and the time the regulator "forgets" previous bursts to w_iP .

On the global-controller side, one would intuitively try to set the w_{global} to a very small value. But as the global controller has no influence on the distribution of memory bursts on the cores and the decisions of the per-core controllers, a small w_{global} value would not result in a better regulation than setting w_{global} to similar values as for the per-cores controllers.

In this paper, we opted to use the same w value for all per-core and the global controller and leave an evaluation of different w trade-offs for future work.

4 Implementation

Before explaining the main components of MemPol, we briefly summarize the relevant features of the Arm architecture and the commonalities of the platforms that have been used for our implementations on the Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 [\(Xilinx,](#page-42-0) [2024b\)](#page-42-0), the NXP i.MX8M [\(NXP,](#page-41-0) [2024a\)](#page-41-0), and the NXP S32G2 [\(NXP,](#page-41-1) [2024c\)](#page-41-1).

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599 4.1 SoC Architecture and CoreSight Debugging Capabilities

600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 Our target platforms include four Arm Cortex-A53 application processor (AP) cores and additionally one or more Arm Cortex-M or Cortex-R real-time processor (RP) cores. The AP cores feature private L1 caches and a shared L2 cache (LLC) and reside in the full-power domain (1 GHz speed or faster) of the SoC. The RP cores are connected to the low-power domain (200–500 MHz speed) of the SoC and have access to private tightly-coupled memories (TCM). A central cache-coherent interconnect (e.g., Arm CCI-400) connects the low- and full-power domains and the main memory controller(s).

609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 Arm defines a common infrastructure (CoreSight) for hardware debugging of its cores [\(ARM,](#page-37-1) [2017\)](#page-37-1). CoreSight specifies registers of memory-mapped debug devices on a low-bandwidth APB bus that can be accessed through a debug access port (DAP). Additionally, the CoreSight infrastructure is accessible for on-chip debugging via the low-power domains on most Arm SoCs. To debug devices connected to CoreSight, the typical setup comprises per-core debug interfaces, performance counters (PMU), trace interfaces, cross trigger interfaces (CTI), and a shared cross trigger matrix (CTM) [\(ARM,](#page-37-2) [2018a,](#page-37-2) [2016a\)](#page-36-0). The CTI exposes core-specific input signals to halt and resume a core, and an output signal to indicate that the core triggered a halting condition. The CTM connects the input and output signals from the CTIs of the cores and allows halting multiple cores on a debug event in a synchronized manner.

620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 The memory-mapped debug interface configures debug trigger conditions, such as breakpoints and watchpoints. It also provides access to a bi-directional debug communication channel register and allows the injection of instructions into the pipeline once the core is halted. A debugger obtains indirect access to the core's registers by injecting instructions to load or store the core's current registers from or to the debug communication channel register. Being at the highest privilege level, the debugger has access to all of the core's registers. Similarly, information provided by performance counters can also be controlled by the memory-mapped PMU interface. Arm mentions the workflows for debugging by an external hardware debugger or by a self-hosted software debugger running on other cores [\(ARM,](#page-36-0) [2016a\)](#page-36-0).

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631 4.2 Exploiting Memory-Mapped Debug and PMU Registers

632 633 634 635 636 637 In the standard workflow to halt a core via the memory-mapped CTI registers, a debugger triggers the *debug request* input of the core. The core eventually enters debug halt state. Before a new request can be sent, the debugger acknowledges the previous debug request, then polls the CTI to ensure that the previous request has been properly de-asserted. To resume a core, a debugger must trigger a debug restart signal via the CTI. The core automatically acknowledges this request.

638 639 640 641 642 643 644 MemPol mimics the behavior of a debugger and appropriately manipulates the CTI debug registers to stall and restart cores. After initial programming, each halt or resume request requires write transactions to the CTI's trigger pulse register, and to the CTI's *trigger acknowledge* register for the acknowledgment of a previous debug request. We discovered experimentally that polling for previous requests is not required if there is a sufficient delay between the writes to the acknowledge register and the

645 646 647 648 trigger register to resume the core. This reduces the number of required memory transactions for a halt-resume cycle to three writes to CTI registers: trigger halt, acknowledge, and trigger resume. In any case, access to the core's debug interface is not needed, as the core's state is not to be modified.

To monitor the PMCs, the PMU register interface provides full access to all six performance counters of a core. After initialization, reading a PMC requires a single read transaction. In our experiments, accesses to a core's memory-mapped PMU registers in a tight loop from a second core show no measurable impact on the performance on the first core. Likewise, the Arm documentation mentions that cache- and memory-related PMCs do not impact a core's execution behavior [\(ARM,](#page-36-0) [2016a\)](#page-36-0). This allows for interference-free remote monitoring.

4.3 MemPol Regulator

658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 We implemented the regulator on one of the real-time cores on the specific SoCs. The regulator exposes a memory-mapped interface in the TCM of its core. Following the design of hardware registers, this interface comprises status and control registers. After booting, a main loop polls the control registers and updates status registers periodically. The interface also exposes the full internal state of the four per-core controllers and the global controller with history buffers of up to 128 entries. This allows inspecting and debugging the regulator's state from the AP cores. For tracing purposes, we used the remaining TCM as a trace buffer to record PMC values.

When enabled, the regulator first programs the last two PMCs of each core (events 0x17 L2 data cache refill, 0x18 L2 data cache write-back), initializes the regulator, and starts the control loop. In each iteration of the control loop, the regulator (1) reads the two PMU counters of each of the four AP cores; (2) takes control decisions for each core based on the per-core and the global controller settings; (3) halts, resumes, or leaves the core's state unchanged; and (4) waits for the start of the next control loop period.

673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 To give cores sufficient time to acknowledge a previous halt request before resuming, we spread the sequence of halting/resuming a core (three memory transactions with delays) as either two CTI transactions in the halting case (trigger halt $+$ trigger nothing) and two CTI transactions in the resume case (acknowledge + trigger resume). If a core's state is unchanged, we perform two dummy writes to the CTI trigger register (trigger nothing + trigger nothing). We further interleave the CTI accesses of all cores, *i.e.*, perform the first CTI transactions for $c_0..c_3$, then followed by the second CTI transactions for $c_0..c_3$. This pattern and the dummy writes ensure a similar execution time in each regulation loop and ensure that cores can fully halt (resp. resume) their activities in parallel to the remaining execution of the control loop and the reading of the PMU registers (in the next loop iteration). In fact, our experiments showed that, after sending the halt signal, cores do not immediately stop, but remain active for some time in the presence of outstanding memory transactions. In an experiment on the ZCU102 where a Cortex-A53 core sends a halt signal to itself and then monitors a timer to detect when it eventually halts, we observed a maximum delay of 320 ns by adding read-modify-write operations (store byte) to cold cachelines before and after

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691 the halt request. The core was able to emit up to 8 further read-modify-write opera-692 693 694 695 696 tions after sending the halt. This number matches the 8 outstanding linefills per core documented for the L2 memory subsystem of the Cortex-A53 core complex [\(ARM,](#page-37-2) [2018a\)](#page-37-2). Since all four cores can have outstanding transactions, we assume the worstcase halt delay to be at most 1.5 µs on the ZCU102. In our experiments, we observed a delay of around 1 µs.

697 698 699 700 701 702 703 The regulator is implemented in a bare-metal C application and compiled to Arm Thumb (Cortex-M) or Arm code (Cortex-R). The implementation requires between 4 and 8 KB code (the larger version includes formatted console output and tracing), 3 KB of data (controller state), and 1 KB stack. Code and data of the regulator is kept in the TCM of the RP, so instruction fetches and data accesses of the regulator do not cause memory interference to the APs. The regulator uses standard 32-bit integer arithmetic and multiplication; no division is needed.

704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 Overall, the 16 transactions to CoreSight registers—i.e., eight to read PMU counters and eight to throttle cores—dominate the execution time of the specific regulator implementation on our platforms (see Sec. [5\)](#page-16-0). Mapping the CoreSight registers as shared device, rather than using a *uncached strongly-ordered* mapping, significantly speeds up write operations, as regulator core does not need to wait for transactions to complete. This allows the writes to the CTI registers to be queued and serialized by the interconnect next to the APB bus rather than the core. We place a DSB memory barrier instruction at the end of the control loop to reduce jitter in the control loop. This ensures that any outstanding writes to CTI registers have finished before starting a new round and reading from the PMU.

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715 4.4 Side Effects

716 717 We have observed the following side effects when using $MemPol$.

718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 Deeper CPU idle modes. Access to the CoreSight registers require that the Cortex-A53 cores are online. This interferes with the power management subsystem of the Linux kernel which turns cores off in deeper power saving modes. Unfortunately, this takes the cores' CoreSight registers offline as well. This causes any access to the core's CoreSight registers to either fail with a data abort exception or get stuck. We therefore have to disable any deeper power saving modes beyond the WFI instruction to idle the cores.[5](#page-15-0) We do not consider this to be a problem for real-time systems that need memory bandwidth regulation, as waking up from deeper power saving modes increases interrupt latencies and is therefore typically disabled.

727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 Freezing system timer in debug mode. Cores entering debug halt state might also halt the global system timer that drive the cores' private virtual and physical timer interrupts. Halting the time and related timer interrupts is a handy feature for system software development when using an external hardware debugger, however this feature interferes with time keeping of the cores when MemPol is used. Likewise, other peripherals can change their behavior in debug mode as well. This behavior depends on the SoC and needs to be disabled in the specific peripherals. We also do not consider

⁷³⁵ 736 ${}^{5}E.g.$ echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu0/cpuidle/state1/disable.

737 738 this to be a problem when using MemPol, as any problems with non-working timer interrupts and I/O show early during testing.

739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 External Hardware Debugging. The setup of CTI and PMU requires taking ownership of the debug interface by disabling software lock registers and then configuring the devices. This interferes with any external hardware debugger that also claims these devices. We have not fully tested hardware debugging together with *MemPol*, but using an external hardware debugger will likely interfere with the regulation. For example, the integrated logic analyzer (ILA) for FPGA development on the ZCU102 takes priority when using the SoC's debugging features and disables MemPol's capabilities to halt or resume cores.

747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 SoC Debugging and TrustZone. TrustZone is a feature of Arm processors that introduces secure and non-secure execution modes of the cores and related access bits for all components in an SoC [ARM](#page-36-0) [\(2016a\)](#page-36-0). This allows to fully isolate securitysensitive software in the SoC, while Linux or an RTOS run in non-secure mode. To separate debugging of secure from non-secure components down to the hardware level, the Arm architecture defines an authentication interface of four signals for invasive / non-invasive debugging in secure / non-secure execution state. Access to the CTI and PMU registers requires at least the invasive resp. non-invasive debugging of non-secure execution state (DBGEN, NIDEN) to be enabled. Monitoring and debugging in secure execution state (*TrustZone* mode) is instead enabled by SPIDEN and SPNIDEN signals. We have not tested *MemPol* with TrustZone, and we do not consider regulating secure applications to be relevant for real-time use cases, as TrustZone introduces additional jitter and interference in the caches. Note that MemGuard faces similar challenges in setting up PMU counters to monitor secure applications from a non-secure hypervisor or operating system. See [Ning et al.](#page-40-3) [\(2021\)](#page-40-3) for further details on the security impact of on-chip monitoring and debugging facilities.

5 Platform Assessment and Sustainable Bandwidth

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We now evaluate our platforms $w.r.t.$ their sustainable bandwidth and their CoreSight register access timing to derive platform-specific settings for the MemPol regulation.

5.1 Determining the Sustainable Bandwidth

We use a dedicated benchmark to evaluate the sustainable memory bandwidth of the platforms.^{[6](#page-16-1)} Similar to the *USTRESS* benchmark [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020\)](#page-42-2), the benchmark probes the memory bandwidth of the DRAM memory controller with different memory access patterns and increasing step sizes over a large memory buffer.

775 776 777 778 779 780 As the memory controller reads and writes memory in units of full cachelines, the benchmark issues various read, write and modify operations on cachelines. The difference between write and modify operations is that write operations always write to full cachelines, while modify operations only update a part of a cacheline, e.g., by overwriting just a single byte. Arm CPUs detect full writes to cachelines and in this case suppress fetching cachelines from the memory controller [\(ARM,](#page-37-2) [2018a\)](#page-37-2).

⁶The benchmark is available at [https://gitlab.com/azuepke/bench.](https://gitlab.com/azuepke/bench)

783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 Therefore, read and write operations stress the read and write performance of the memory controller independently, while a large number of *modify* operations eventually leads to an interleaved read/write pattern once all cachelines in the caches become dirty, as for each modification a new cachelines is read and an older one is written back. The interleaved read/write pattern additionally stresses the internal scheduling capabilities of the DRAM controller, which prioritizes reads over writes, leading to worst-case scenarios. Lastly, by increasing the step size of memory accesses in powerof-two steps, the benchmark probes specific bits of the physical addresses to trigger the worst-case behavior of DRAM, i.e., row misses in the same DRAM bank. The recent work of [Fernandez-De-Lecea et al.](#page-38-1) [\(2023\)](#page-38-1) provides a comprehensive overview on the multicore interference effects in DRAM controllers.

794 795 796 797 798 799 800 We obtain the sustainable bandwidth results by running the benchmark on Linux. Except for the default processes by the specific distributions, the Linux system is mostly idle. No graphical user environment is running. We disabled power-saving[7](#page-17-0) and configured each system to support 128 128 MiB of huge pages.⁸ The benchmark is pinned to the first CPU. We let the benchmark test different memory access patterns for 10 seconds each on a 32 MiB sized memory buffer that is mapped using 2 MiB huge pages.[9](#page-17-2)

801 802 803 804 805 806 807 Figures [6,](#page-19-0) [7,](#page-20-1) and [8](#page-22-0) show the results of the benchmark runs on our platforms. Straight lines show the observed memory bandwidth on the CPU core, while dotted lines show the sum of the two PMCs relevant for bandwidth regulation (see Sec. [4.3\)](#page-14-0). The benchmark performs three types of read operations, namely load using normal load instructions, *ldnp* using non-temporal loads, and *prfm L1* using prefetches to the L1 cache (PRFM PLDL1KEEP instruction). Prefetches to the L2 cache (not shown) yield similar results. Prefetches achieve much read higher performance in general, as they

808 809 810 811 812 813 814 don't block the pipeline and get handled by the memory subsystem in the background. Likewise, the benchmark performs three types of *write* operations (to full cachelines), *store* using normal store instructions, *stnp* using non-temporal stores, and dc zva using the data cache zero instruction. The different types of stores show similar performance characteristics. However, the figures show that the selected PMCs 0x17 for L2 data cache refills and 0x18 for L2 data cache write-backs slightly undercount (dotted lines) the bandwidth observed at the core.

815 816 817 818 Lastly, the benchmark performs two types of *modify* operations by using normal store (mod) and non-temporal store $(mod \text{ }\mathit{stnp})$ instructions. As expected, figures show that the PMC bandwidth is twice as high as the one at the core, since modify comprises both read and write operations.

819 820 821 822 823 824 The results on all three platforms show that the achievable memory bandwidth drops when the step size increments, until it plateaus at a specific minimum bandwidth (the empirically obtained sustainable bandwidth). The results then slightly increase again at step sizes 131072 and 262144. This is most likely a side effect of the benchmark as the number of accessed cachelines shrink in each increment and cache hits become more likely.

⁸²⁶ ⁷We set the scaling governor setting of all CPUs to performance.

⁸²⁷ ⁸sysctl -w vm.nr hugepages=64

⁸²⁸ 9 bench --delay 10000 --size 32 --huge --perf --cpu 0 --auto --all --csv x.csv

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829 830 831 Running multiple instances of the benchmark on each CPU in parallel confirms that the memory controller is the bottleneck, rather than the CPU cores, the interconnect, or the caches.

832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 Our selection of α_r and α_w parameters for the regulation is guided by the differences in achievable sustainable bandwidth shown by read and write operations. For example, if writes show a significantly lower bandwidth behavior than reads, we want the regulator to penalize write-heavy applications over read-heavy ones, and adjust the two factors inversely proportional to their bandwidth. In practice, we keep $\alpha_r = 1$ and increase $\alpha_w > 1$ accordingly to compensate for the heavier impact of the writes. This results in a simple linear model of bandwidth usage for both reads and writes. Note that the factors can be set differently, $e.g.,$ to account for possible denial-ofservice attacks on the writeback buffers in the shared cache [\(Bechtel and Yun,](#page-37-0) [2019\)](#page-37-0), although we haven't conducted further evaluations on this aspect.

We discuss the individual results in the following sections.

5.2 Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102

The Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 [\(Xilinx,](#page-42-0) [2024b\)](#page-42-0) is a revision 1.0 board equipped with a zugeg SoC and 4 GiB DDR4 RAM. Each Cortex-A53 core has separate 32 KiB L1 caches for instruction and data. The four APs are configured in a single cluster configuration and share 1 MiB of L2 cache. Next to the APs running at 1.2 GHz, the SoC provides two Cortex-R5 RPs running at 500 MHz. Each Cortex-R5 core is equipped with 128 KiB of local memory (TCM). The SoC additionally includes a programmable logic (PL) part (an FPGA) that is not used by our experiments. We include the regulator in the BOOT.BIN file of the system and load the regulator on the first Cortex-R5 core at boot time. We further use the PetaLinux 2021.1 distribution provided by Xilinx with Linux kernel 5.4.

5.2.1 ZCU102 Bandwidth Assessment

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858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 The bandwidth assessment in Fig. [6](#page-19-0) shows a peak read bandwidth of $B_{peak-core,r}$ = 4393 MB/s (prfm L1) and a peak write bandwidth $B_{peak-core,w} = 668460 \text{ MB/s}$ (store). We also observe an undercounting of write operations in PMCs of about 3% (dotted lines). However, with an increment of 128 KiB, we observe a sustainable bandwidth of 1027 MB/s for reading, 985 MB/s for writing and 483 MB/s for modify. Because read and write bandwidths are within 5% difference, we assume a single sustainable memory bandwidth value of $B_{sustainable} \approx 1000 \text{ MB/s}$ (954 MiB/s) for the ZCU as simplification and to improve readability. Then fractions of the bandwidth then compute nicely to bandwidth values, e.g., 20% is 200 MB/s .

867 868 869 870 These results are in line with previously reported performance metrics of the same platform [\(Schwaericke et al.,](#page-42-4) [2021\)](#page-42-4). We observe a slightly lower bandwidth on a second ZCU102 board in our lab that is equipped with different DRAM (read 1015 MB/s, write 935 MB/s, modify 478 MB/s, slow-down already at 64 KiB step size).

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 Fig. 6 Sustainable bandwidth on Xilinx ZCU102: Assessment of memory bandwidth over 16 MiB block with different step sizes to trigger worst-case performance behaviour in the memory subsystem. Lines represent the bandwidth observed by the core. Dotted lines track the PMCs relevant for bandwidth regulation. Sec. [5.1](#page-16-2) explains details.

5.2.2 ZCU102 MemPol Regulation

 We measured the access time from both the APs and RPs to CoreSight registers. On the ZCU102, we measured a mean overhead for reading resp. writing of 303 resp. 213 ns from the Cortex-A53 cores and of 274/216 ns from the R5 cores. While stressing the memory subsystem in parallel to the tests, we observed that latencies on our ZCU102 increase up to 1146/643 ns for access from the Cortex-A53 cores. This hints to bottlenecks at the interconnect level between the A53 cores and the low-power domain. Accessing the CoreSight registers from the R5 cores shows lower latencies, as the transactions take a different path and stay in the SoC's low-power domain. We stressed the routers in the low-power domain by accessing I/O devices in the lowpower domain from the A53 cores in parallel, but this did not increase the latencies for accesses from the R5 cores much.

 Profiling of the MemPol regulation running on the first R5 core showed that the execution of the control loop takes between 4.8 to 5.2 µs. Overall, we add a safety margin to the observed values and set the period of the control loop to 6.25 us to get a nice factor for human readable timings.

5.2.3 ZCU102 Cost Model

 In the cost model of the MemPol controller, the sustainable memory bandwidth of $B_{sustainable} \approx 1000 \text{ MB/s}$ this translates to 97.656 cachelines of 64 B per 6.25 µs period with weight-factors $\alpha_r = \alpha_w = 1$ for both reading and writing, as read and write performance are quite similar.[10](#page-19-1)

 ¹⁰The implementation uses a factor of $\alpha = 1000$ and a budget of 97656 cachelines per loop to compensate any loss of precision in the decimal places.

 Based on the peak bandwidth, we assume an overshooting factor $\beta =$ $max(B_{peak-core,*})/B_{sustainable} = 8.46$, or peaks of up to 826 cachelines in 6.25 µs. Experiments with the benchmark from Sec. [5.1](#page-16-2) show peak PMC values of 456 refills, 831 write-backs, and 831 for the sum of both counter values.

5.3 NXP i.MX8M

 The NXP i.MX8M Quad [\(NXP,](#page-41-0) [2024a\)](#page-41-0) is evaluated on the Coral Dev Board (Phanbell) by Google. It supports a single cluster of four Cortex-A53 cores running at 1.5 GHz, 32 KiB L1 instruction and data caches each, a shared 1 MiB L2 cache, and 1 GiB LPDDR4 memory. The real-time companion core is a Cortex-M4 with 256 KiB TCM which is clocked at 200 MHz on the Coral Dev Board. We load the regulator binary with the bootaux command of the U-Boot bootloader. We use the Mendel Eagle distribution with Linux kernel 4.14.98.

To prevent side effects, we have to clear the HDBG bit in the SYS CTR CONTROL CNTCR register to prevent the core timers to be halted when a core is halted (see Sec. [4.4\)](#page-15-1). Also, the UART reacts to the debug signals and must be properly configured [\(NXP,](#page-41-6) [2021\)](#page-41-6).

5.3.1 i.MX8M Bandwidth Assessment

Fig. 7 Sustainable bandwidth on NXP i.MX8M: Assessment of memory bandwidth over 16 MiB block with different step sizes to trigger worst-case performance behaviour in the memory subsystem. Lines represent the bandwidth observed by the core. Dotted lines track the PMCs relevant for bandwidth regulation. Sec. [5.1](#page-16-2) explains details.

 Fig. [7](#page-20-1) shows the bandwidth measurements on the i.MX8M. We observe a peak read bandwidth of $B_{peak-core,r} = 3813 \text{ MB/s } (prfm L1)$ and a peak write bandwidth $B_{peak-core,w} =$ of 10235 MB/s (store). We already see the bandwidth dropping at an increment of 32 KiB, with 976 MB/s for reading, 911 MB/s for writing and 462 MB/s

 when modifying cachelines. We again use a unified sustainable memory bandwidth value of $B_{sustainable} \approx 924 \text{ MB/s}$ (882 MiB/s) for the i.MX8M, even if the difference between reading is about 7%. Like on the ZCU102, we observe an undercounting of writes in PMCs of about 3%.

5.3.2 i.MX8M MemPol Regulation

 We measured the access time to the CoreSight registers from the Cortex-M4 core in a tight loop while the Cortex-A53 were active. Reading a CoreSight registers takes between 47 and 57 cycles (235 ns to 285 ns), while writing takes 51 to 60 cycles (255 ns to 300 ns) on the M4. Activity on the A53 cores did not further increase the latencies. We measured a worst-case of 1371 cycles (6.855 us) for the regulation loop of the MemPol regulator. We add a safety margin and use a 10 us period for the control loop.

5.3.3 i.MX8M Cost Model

 On the the i.MX8M, the sustainable memory bandwidth of $B_{sustainable} \approx 924 \text{ MB/s}$ relates to 144.375 cachelines per 10 µs period, and we set the weight-factors $\alpha_r =$ $\alpha_w = 1$ for both reading and writing.

 The overshooting factor of $\beta = max(B_{peak-core,*})/B_{sustainable} = 11.08$ is higher than on the ZCU102 due to the higher peak performance. We can expect peaks of up to 1600 cachelines in 10 µs. Our experiments show peak PMC values of 709 refills, 1599 write-backs, and 1599 for the sum of both PMCs in practice.

 5.4 NXP S32G2

 L1 data and instruction caches. A Network-on-a-Chip (NoC) interconnect connects all components on the SoC. The A53 cores run at 1 GHz, while the M7 cores use 400 MHz. The manual mentions that the debug APB is clocked at 50 MHz [\(NXP,](#page-41-7) [2023\)](#page-41-7). The NXP S32G274 is designed for automotive purposes [\(NXP,](#page-41-1) [2024c\)](#page-41-1). We evaluate the SoC in revision 2.0 on a MicroSys S32G274AR2SBC2 evaluation board with 4 GiB LPDDR4 RAM. The S32G2 provides two clusters of two Cortex-A53. This allows the two cores of each cluster to run in a lock-step configuration. Each core has the usual 32 KiB L1 data and instruction caches. The two cluster have 512 KiB shared L2 cache each. On the RP side, the S32G2 has six Cortex-M7 cores in dual lock-step, so the software side sees three cores. The M7 cores have 64 KiB of TCM and also 32 KiB

 kept in the internal SRAM at address 0x34100000, as the M7 core lacks a dedicated TCM for instructions. We configure the instruction cache to speed up execution. The regulator's data is kept in the data TCM of the M7 core. We start the Cortex-M7 using the startm7 command from U-Boot. We further evaluate the S32G with Linux kernel version 5.15.73 by the CPU vendor. We run the MemPol regulator on the first Cortex-M7 core. The regulator code is

5.4.1 S32G2 Bandwidth Assessment

 The S32G2 shows a different behavior for its memory bandwidth in Fig. [8](#page-22-0) than the 1011 The set of shows a dimension senation for the instance, senation in 1 g. c. cannot the ZCU102 or the i.MX8M. From a peak read bandwidth of $B_{peak-core,r} = 2000$ MB/s

Fig. 8 Sustainable bandwidth on NXP S32G2: Assessment of memory bandwidth over 16 MiB block with different step sizes to trigger worst-case performance behaviour in the memory subsystem. Lines represent the bandwidth observed by the core. Dotted lines track the PMCs relevant for bandwidth regulation. Sec. [5.1](#page-16-2) explains details.

(prfm L1) and a peak write bandwidth $B_{peak-core,w} =$ of 4420 MB/s (store), we quickly drop off to the low bandwidth plateau at a step size of 4 KiB. The then observe $B_{sustainable,r} = 956$ MiB/s for reading, $B_{sustainable,w} = 679$ MiB/s for writing, and 394 MiB/s when changing cachelines. This makes it hard to assign a single sustainable bandwidth value. Instead, we assign the two values for reading and writing as sustainable bandwidth (see Sec. [5.4.3\)](#page-23-1).

5.4.2 S32G2 MemPol Regulation

Accessing the CoreSight registers on the S32G2 from the first main Cortex-A53 core takes 450 resp. 257 ns for reading resp. writing. The Cortex-M7 core can read registers faster at 420 ns, but writing takes the same time. The timing on the Cortex-M7 core is 420 resp. 257 ns for reading resp. writing. For the regulation loop of the MemPol regulator, we observed a worst-case execution time of 2987 cycles (7.468 µs) during our tests. Like on the i.MX8M, we again use a 10 µs period for MemPol's control loop.

 The S32G2 provides an alternative mechanism to obtain the relevant performance counters. The Cortex-A53 core exports some of its internal signals that feed the PMCs also on the PMUEVENT bus, including the ones related to L2 cache activity. This allows external hardware to monitor the core from the outside without using the CoreSight registers [\(ARM,](#page-37-2) [2018a\)](#page-37-2). The S32G2 implements one PMUEVENT bus observer unit for each A53 core with dedicated 8-bit wide counters for each signal on the PMUEVENT bus [\(NXP,](#page-41-7) [2023\)](#page-41-7). We measured that these counters can be read in 293 ns from the Cortex-M7 cores. However, we cannot reliably use these counters for regulation, as the peak memory in a regulation period would overflow the counters.[11](#page-22-1)

¹¹The PMUEVENT bus observer unit is primarily intended to count cache, TLB and bus error events.

5.4.3 S32G2 Cost Model

 For the cost model on the S32G2, we cannot use a single metric for the sustainable
1061 means has hadded France the mass and metrics of R_{eff} and $\frac{0.05 \text{ N} \cdot \text{m}}{0.05 \text{ N} \cdot \text{m}}$ reading and $B_{sustainable,w} = 679$ MiB/s for writing, we can derive different weight-
 1663 for the stiffness of a set of the stiffness gets multiplied by 1.408 by the regulator, and $B_{sustainable} = 956$ MiB/s is reduced to $\frac{1000}{1067}$ a single value.^{[12](#page-23-2)} $\frac{1001}{1062}$ memory bandwidth. From the measured metrics of $B_{sustainable,r} = 956$ MiB/s for factors of $\alpha_r = 1$ for reading and $\alpha_w = 1.408$ for writing to account for the differences. This means that the value of the PMC monitoring the L2 data cache write-back (0x18)

1068 factor α_w as well. Our overshooting factor becomes $\beta = \alpha_w B_{peak-core,w}/B_{sustainable}$ = action a_w as went our overshooting factor becomes $p = a_w p_{peak-core,w}/p_{sustanable}$
1070 6.51, or peaks of up to 972 weighted or 690 unweighted cachelines in 10 µs. In our experiments, we observed peak raw (unweighted) PMC values of 367 for L2 cache refills and 834 for write-backs and the sum of both counter values. However, this now inflates the overshooting of the peak write bandwidth by the

$\frac{1079}{1074}$ 5.5 Further Platforms

We additionally evaluated the feasibility of *MemPol* on further platforms.

 $\frac{1076}{1075}$ Raspberry Pi 4. On the Raspberry Pi 4 [\(Raspberry Pi Ltd,](#page-41-2) [2024\)](#page-41-2), we benchmarked 1078 135 resp. 122 ns. We are also able to halting and resuming of cores through the debug 1079 interface. A *MemPol* regulation would be possible on the Raspberry Pi 4 (probably $\frac{1080}{1081}$ even with a fast regulation cycle of 2.5 µs as the numbers suggest), but we skipped 1081 further evaluation of this platform as the regulation would have to run on one of the system's four Cortex-A72 cores. that the reading resp. writing of CoreSight registers from its Cortex-A72 cores takes

 NXP LX2160A. We run the same experiment on the NXP LX2160A [\(NXP,](#page-41-3) [2024b\)](#page-41-3) and observe 374 resp. 366 ns for CoreSight accesses from the Cortex-A72 cores. Also, halting and resuming of cores through the CTI works as expected. We also 1087 did not further consider this platform for evaluation for the same reason as for the Raspberry Pi 4.

 NVIDIA Jetson AGX Orin. The same experiment to access the other cores' Core- Sight registers failed on the NVIDIA Jetson AGX Orin development kit with its twelve Cortex-A78 cores [\(NVIDIA,](#page-40-1) [2024a\)](#page-40-1). The platform additionally includes a Cortex-R5 that could be used to host the regulation. Here, the firmware did not enable the platform's debug authentication signals (DBGEN, NIDEN), thus making an evaluation impossible (see Sec. [4.4\)](#page-15-1).

1096 6 6 Evaluation

1098 We perform most of the evaluation of *MemPol* on the ZCU102 platform. Here, the regulator runs bare-metal on the R5 core and is independent of the operating system on the application cores. It is loaded during system startup as part of the boot loader configuration, and it remains inactive until the benchmarks configure its parameters

 arithmetic. ¹²In the implementation, we set $\alpha_r = 1000$ and $\alpha_w = 1408$ to prevent the need for floating-point

1105 1106 and start it. The regulator polls PMU counters every 6.25 µs and using a default sliding window size w of 8 entries (50 µs) (see Sec. [5.2\)](#page-18-0).

1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 We evaluate the details of MemPol's regulation with a set of experiments on a lightweight RTOS, which allows full control of cores activities and of the physical memory layout. We have implemented MemGuard on the RTOS for low-level comparisons with MemPol. Furthermore, we perform a comparison of MemPol and MemGuard from [Bechtel and Yun](#page-37-0) [\(2019\)](#page-37-0) on Linux using the San Diego Vision Benchmark Suite (SD-VBS) [\(Venkata et al.,](#page-42-5) [2009\)](#page-42-5). In the SD-VBS, we hook into photonStartTiming() and photonEndTiming() to measure execution times and to precisely coordinate the start of the regulation. The plots in this section show the aggregated core's L2 cache activity over time as memory accesses (number of cachelines) and as the percentage of the sustainable bandwidth. Averages over $t-100$ us to $t+100$ us are shown as thick lines.[13](#page-24-1)

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6.1 Per-Core Regulation

We first present experiments of the per-core regulation based on both read and write access measurements. The test applications generate different memory access patterns. The patterns differ in the access type (loads, stores, or modifications of full cachelines) and in the stress they cause in the memory controller (worst-case accesses or linear accesses).

1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 Fig. [3](#page-7-1) shows a worst-case reader regulated by both MemGuard and MemPol. In both cases, we can observe the number of L2 cache refills matches the worstcase of approx. 97 cachelines per 6.25 µs. The worst-case readers use PRFM PLDL1KEEP instructions to prefetch data to the L1 cache instead of using normal loads. This removes any dependencies in the core's pipeline to wait for the loaded data.

1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 Focusing on MemPol only, Fig. [9](#page-25-0) shows different memory access patterns changing every 250 µs on a core regulated at 50% of the sustainable bandwidth. Starting from the left, the application first performs worst-case loads (each load causes a bank switch) for 250 µs. In the subsequent ranges of 250 µs each, the test performs 2, 4, and 8 memory accesses to the same bank before switching bank. In the next four ranges, the application repeats the same patterns, but with stores to whole cachelines instead of loads, thus ensuring that cachelines bypass the cache (write-through). Finally, the application does read-modify-write accesses to cachelines. The number of memory accesses is the same in each test, but the latencies at the memory controller differ. Fig. [9](#page-25-0) shows three main trends. (1) Linear memory accesses are handled faster than worst-case ones. (2) As expected, higher overshooting corresponds to longer idle times. (3) Buffering of write transactions causes more frequent and higher spikes than reads. We also note that a variation of the worst-case load pattern starting at 250 us generates higher overshooting than peak accesses at 750 µs.

1145 1146 1147 1148 Fig. [10](#page-25-1) shows the behavior of MemPol in simultaneously enforcing different bandwidth levels. Here, cores c_0 and c_1 at 10% (20%) levels perform worst-case reads (writes—to whole cachelines), while cores c_2 and c_3 at 30% (40%) levels perform linear reads (writes). Overall, the cores meet their average bandwidth targets, despite

1150 ¹³A moving average of 200 µs proved to be a good trade-off to show the regulation trends even in case of overshooting.

 Fig. 9 Polling regulation at 6.25 µs of a core at 50% sustainable memory bandwidth. The core performs three series of four different memory access patterns every 250 µs: four read patterns, four same each time, but peak-behavior increases within a series. 200 µs averages. 1168 write patterns, then four modify (read-write) patterns. The overall number of memory accesses is the

1186 Fig. 10 MemPol regulates cores at different bandwidth levels: c_0 worst-case reader at 10%, c_1 worst-case writer at 20%, c² peak reader at 30%, c³ peak writer at 40%. Polling 6.25 µs. 50 µs sliding window size. 200 µs averages.

1190 the visible overshooting of cores c_2 and c_3 . Note the quite regular distance between spikes for the individual cores, and that the height of the spikes relates to the memory access pattern.

Fig. 11 200 µs averages of PMCs of a run of tracking in VGA resolution. The graphs show (a) L2 refills, (b) L2 write-backs, and (c) combined L2 refills and write-backs. MemGuard regulates based on (a), MemPol based on (c).

6.2 Regulation based on L2 Data Cache Refill and Write-Back

As mentioned in Sec. [2,](#page-3-0) the single monitoring dimension used by MemGuard may lead to memory under-utilization and may not correctly account for $e.g.,$ write-heavy behaviors. By monitoring multiple dimensions at once, MemPol can instead overcome these limitations as shown in this experiment that measures the impact of L2 cache write-backs on the regulation model (Sec. [3.1\)](#page-7-0). For this, we record the PMU counters for a full unregulated run of the tracking SD-VBS benchmark. Fig. [11](#page-26-1) shows the sampled L2 cache refill and write-back counters. After initial preparation (up to approx. 180 ms), the benchmark starts to track objects in four consecutive images for about about 100 ms each.

 The bandwidth reported by the L2 cache refill counter (Fig. [11](#page-26-1) (a)) shows that the bandwidth stays mostly below the 25% mark during the execution, with one larger and four minor spikes beyond the 50% mark. This is the data that *MemGuard* uses for regulation. In contrast, when also monitoring the L2 cache write-back counter, Fig. [11](#page-26-1) (b) shows that the benchmark typically consumes between 10 to 15% of the bandwidth, but causes many frequent write-peaks beyond the 200% mark. Fig. [11](#page-26-1) (c) shows the combined L2 cache counters that are used by $MemPol$ -regulation following the cost model in Sec. [3.1.](#page-7-0) We see that the overall bandwidth demand accumulates and sometimes exceeds the 250% mark.

 Compared to MemGuard, MemPol can precisely track the write behavior and correctly account for the previous state of the L2 cache. Instead, to correctly regulate, MemGuard must make pessimistic assumptions on the write behavior, or must use statistical information obtained by prior profiling [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020\)](#page-42-2).

6.3 Impact of Sliding Window Size

 Fig. 12 Three runs of tracking in VGA resolution regulated at 20% sustainable memory bandwidth. The graphs detail the first write peak (Fig. [11](#page-26-1) at around 45 ms) for different sliding window sizes of 50 µs, 100 µs and 200 µs. Larger sliding window sizes allow the benchmark to reach the peak earlier, i.e., at around 60 ms (200 µs) instead of 63.8 ms or 65.5 ms (50 µs).

 1270 sustainable bandwidth with different settings for w focusing on the first write peak 1271 at around 45 ms in the unregulated run Fig. [11.](#page-26-1) In the experiment, smaller w causes 1272 larger slowdown *(i.e.*, the spikes appear later) than bigger w values. For example, 1273 at $w = 8$ (50 µs), the execution is slowed down for up to 5.5 ms. This shows that certain workloads are sensitive to the sliding window size and require profiling to find acceptable settings. Obviously, for small sliding windows the regulation is less tolerant to periodically repeating spikes, as the margins to compensate for the spikes in non-memory-intensive phases reduce. Fig. [12](#page-27-0) compares three regulated runs of the tracking SD-VBS benchmark at 20%

 6.4 Redistribution of Memory Bandwidth by Global Regulator

 1282 global regulator. Here, core c_0 (regulated at 50%) alternates between memory access 1283 and idle phases, while core c_1 (regulated at 25%) always performs memory accesses. When the global regulation is disabled (Fig. [13\)](#page-28-0), the overall bandwidth drops to 25% 1285 when c_0 is idle. Instead, when the global regulation is enabled (Fig. [14\)](#page-29-0), c_1 is allowed to use any remaining bandwidth up to the global configured limit of 75%. In both cases, from being idle, as the local regulator for c_0 lets the core consume the bandwidth up Fig. [13](#page-28-0) and [14](#page-29-0) show the redistribution of unused memory bandwidth of MemPol's we can observe a slight overshooting of the average global bandwidth when c_0 returns

Fig. 13 MemPol bandwidth redistribution: global regulation disabled. Core c_0 is regulated at 50% bandwidth and alternates memory access and idle phases every 750 µs. Core c_1 is regulated at 25% bandwidth and accesses memory all the time. Both cores perform worst-case reading. The global regulator is disabled and unused bandwidth is not redistributed. Polling at 6.25 µs. 50 µs sliding window size. 200 us averages.

to its budget. The global regulator cannot prevent this, as it can only override the halt decision of the local per-core regulator as described in Sec. [3.7.](#page-12-1)

6.5 Comparing Regulation of MemPol and MemGuard

 We compare the regulation of MemPol and MemGuard using SD-VBS. We leverage the framework in [Nicolella et al.](#page-40-4) [\(2022\)](#page-40-4) to run automated tests to measure the execution time of all benchmarks under regulation and co-scheduled with other benchmarks, and we compare the results to unregulated executions in isolation. After several initial runs, we observed that disparity, mser, sift, stitch, and tracking provide the most noteworthy result for this experiment. We use sliding window sizes of 50 µs, 100 µs, and 200 µs for *MemPol*, and compare them to replenishment periods of 50 µs, 100 µs, µs, and 1 ms for MemGuard.

 In our first set of experiments (Fig. [15\)](#page-30-0), we evaluate the regulated benchmarks at 20%, 30%, and 40% of the sustainable bandwidth, which are typical settings for one core in a four core setup. For comparable results between MemPol and MemGuard, we constraint MemPol to use only the L2 cache refill counter instead of the more precise combined model (Sec. [6.2\)](#page-26-0). Also, MemPol's global regulation is disabled. We run the benchmarks in isolation (first horizontal group in Fig. [15\)](#page-30-0) and together with Isol-Bench on another core (60% bandwidth) or on three other cores $(3 \times 20\%)$ bandwidth), and we measure the slowdown ratio. As expected, overheads in execution time compared to the unregulated baseline increase for smaller regulation periods and lower bandwidths. In both *MemPol* and *MemGuard* setups, mser is the most affected one by the parallel execution with *IsolBench*, while, in general, the number of co-runners has no significant impact on the regulation. Overall, even when using only the L2 cache

 1353 regulator is enabled and redistributes unused bandwidth from c_0 to c_1 while c_0 is idle, but keeps the 1354 overall bandwidth at 75%, which the sum of both cores' configured bandwidth. Polling at 6.25 µs. Fig. 14 MemPol bandwidth redistribution: global regulation enabled. Core c_0 is regulated at 50% bandwidth and alternates memory access and idle phases every 750 μ s. Core c_1 is regulated at 25% bandwidth and accesses memory all the time. Both cores perform worst-case reading. The global µs sliding window size. 200 µs averages.

1357 refill counter, MemPol regulates comparably to MemGuard, with MemGuard showing higher overheads at smaller regulation periods due to the increased interrupt load.

		1360 Table 1 SD-VBS read and write memory bandwidth settings for MemGuard							
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 In our second set of experiments we compare MemPol to MemGuard with write regulation enabled. To setup $MemGuard$ bandwidth levels for its write regulation correctly, we first measured the ratio of L2 refills and L2 write-backs for each SD-VBS benchmark in isolation. We ran each benchmark for 50 iterations in VGA resolution and obtained the L2 refill and write-back PMCs before and after the runs. Table [1](#page-29-1) shows that the benchmarks fluctuate between 3.2:1 (mser) and 1:1.04 (disparity) in their read:write ratio. With these insights, we calculate benchmark-specific read and write bandwidth settings for $MemGuard$. Table [1](#page-29-1) shows the bandwidth values for a target bandwidth of 20%, 30% and 40% of the sustainable bandwidth. For MemPol, we simply configure the combined bandwidth value (Sec. [6.2\)](#page-26-0). $MemPol$'s global regulation

1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 Fig. 15 Slowdown ratio in execution time of SD-VBS regulated at 20%, 30% or 40% sustainable bandwidth with read regulation compared to unregulated execution (slowdown ratio 1.0) as baseline. The slowdown is caused by memory bandwidth regulation (MemPol, MemGuard) and by implementation overheads (interrupt handling in MemGuard, see Sec. [2.1\)](#page-4-2). The colored bars represent the relative mean overhead of 10 runs. The small vertical black lines on top of the bars show min/max. The benchmarks run alone or in parallel with *IsolBench* on one or three other cores. We evaluate MemPol and MemGuard at different sliding window sizes / regulation periods. MemPol regulates using L2 cache refill counters only, like $MemGuard$. MemPol's global regulation is turned off.

Fig. 16 Slowdown ratio in execution time of SD-VBS regulated at 20%, 30% or 40% sustainable bandwidth with read/write regulation compared to unregulated execution (slowdown ratio 1.0) as baseline. The slowdown is caused by memory bandwidth regulation (MemPol, MemGuard) and by implementation overheads (interrupt handling in MemGuard, see Sec. [2.1\)](#page-4-2). The colored bars represent the relative mean overhead of 10 runs. The small vertical black lines on top of the bars show min/max. The benchmarks run in isolation, like in the first row in Fig. [15.](#page-30-0) We evaluate MemPol and MemGuard at different sliding window sizes / regulation periods. MemPol regulates using both L2 cache refill and write-back counters, while MemGuard uses the bandwidth settings in Table [1.](#page-29-1) MemPol's global regulation is turned off.

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 is again disabled. Fig[.16](#page-30-1) shows the comparison between MemPol and MemGuard for a run of each benchmark at the given bandwidth levels on the first core of an otherwise idle system. Compared to the similar run using just read-regulation in the top horizontal group in Fig. [15,](#page-30-0) the read-write-based regulation causes a higher slowdown for tracking, as the regulation has now to account for the write-spikes shown in Fig. [11.](#page-26-1) This affects both *MemPol* and *MemGuard*. disparity and mser follow this trend, but are less affected. We can also observe that the selected approach of using the ratio between L2 refill and write-back PMCs to derive the regulation parameters for Mem-Guard does not lead to similar outcomes as for $MemPol$. Especially disparity, mser and tracking show higher overheads for *MemGuard* beyond what the read regulation in Fig. [15](#page-30-0) shows. This is because the ratio is not homogeneous during the execution of

1444 **Fig. 17** Slowdown ratio in execution time of SD-VBS regulated at 20% and 30% sustainable band-1445 width compared to unregulated execution (slowdown ratio 1.0) as baseline. The slowdown is caused 1446 by memory bandwidth regulation (MemPol, MemGuard) and by implementation overheads (inter-1447 rupt handling in $MemGuard$, see Sec. [2.1\)](#page-4-2). The colored bars represent the relative mean overhead 1448 parallel with another instance of a benchmark with the same bandwidth settings on a second core. 1449 We evaluate MemPol and MemGuard at different sliding window sizes / regulation periods. We also 1450 include results with $MemPol$'s global regulation enabled at 40% resp. 60% global bandwidth. Mem-1451 Pol regulates using L2 cache refill counters only, like MemGuard. of 10 runs. The small vertical black lines on top of the bars show min/max. The benchmarks run in

1453 1454 parallel on two cores with an equal regulation of 20% and 30% (Fig. [15](#page-30-0) shows that 20% 1455 and 30% are the most interesting bandwidth settings). Here we also enable $MemPol$'s [14](#page-31-1)56 global regulation¹⁴ and use 40% resp. 60% for the global bandwidth. Similarly to 1457 Fig. [15,](#page-30-0) for a fair comparison, we restrict MemPol to only use the L2 cache refill 1458 counter for regulation. From the benchmarks, we select disparity, sift, and tracking 1459 as co-runners, as they run for a longer time. Similarly to Fig. [15,](#page-30-0) the regulations 1460 of MemPol and MemGuard are in general comparable. The global regulation never 1461 causes higher overheads, but its benefits are strongly dependent on the benchmark 1462 combinations (disparity and mser benefit the most). Interestingly, MemPol's global 1463 regulation helps disparity when run in parallel to tracking, but not vice versa (bottom 1464 left vs. top right), because tracking is compute-bound (see Fig. [12](#page-27-0) (a)), but disparity 1465 is memory-bound. In our third set of experiments (Fig. [17\)](#page-31-0), we evaluate the benchmarks executing in

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¹⁴⁶⁷ 6.6 Discussion 1468

1469 The evaluation section has shown the potential of the fine-grained regulation, flexibil- 1470 ity, and low-overheads enabled by $MemPol$. Additionally, even when considering only

¹⁴⁷² 14 ^{It} does not make sense to evaluate bandwidth redistribution with memory hogs like *IsolBench*.

1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 one regulation dimension, MemPol achieves comparable or better results than Mem-Guard. While MemGuard shows no control delays and halts cores when they reach or exceed their bandwidth limits, MemPol's behavior is driven by both the polling frequency in its control loop and delays in halting via the debug interface. This leads to overshooting, which is amplified by the difference between sustainable bandwidth targets (needed by regulation in real-time systems), and the peak bandwidth the memory controller can deliver in best-case conditions. On the other hand, MemPol can consider a wider range of metrics for regulation (compared to just a single PMU counter in MemGuard's case) and enables microsecond-scale regulation that also help to mitigate the side effects of overshooting and to bound blocking times of the cores.

1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 Although MemPol is a good starting point for novel regulation schemes based on polling, our investigation have shown that non-polling-based regulators (e.g., Mem -Guard) would benefit from a smarter PMU architectures that allow aggregating the sum of multiple PMU counters for regulation. However, such an improved PMU would still be limited, as it does not include data of other IP blocks such as the memory controller. Using polling, [Saeed et al.](#page-42-3) [\(2022\)](#page-42-3) shows that the aggregation of data from multiple sources is *necessary* to reduce the heavy pessimism in memory regulation caused by the spread in real bandwidth behavior. In any case, it would be beneficial for all types of regulators if hardware vendors provide PMU counters with fast access for outside agents at any level in the memory hierarchy and disclose information on how to use them.

1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 With *MemPol*, we show a regulation that uses multiple PMU counters (read and write regulation) and even considers combined results of all cores for its global regulation. Furthermore, instead of relying on the pessimistic sustainable bandwidth metric, MemPol's bandwidth redistribution of the global regulation can easily be extended to sample utilization of the memory controller if available on the platform $(e.g.,$ [Saeed](#page-42-3) [et al.](#page-42-3) [\(2022\)](#page-42-3)). Note that MemGuard also supports bandwidth redistribution, but its bandwidth reclaiming mechanism redistributes future budgets that it predicts will remain unused based on the history of per-core memory consumption. The approach offers no guarantees that a donating core can reclaim its budget when needed [\(Yun](#page-43-1) [et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016\)](#page-43-1). Compared to MemGuard with typical regulation periods of 1 ms, the 50 µs setting for MemPol may lead to a pessimistic control behavior for programs with memory-intensive phases that exceed the configured budgets. On the other hand, a low setting for w reduces the window for temporal interference with other bus masters. This is a trade-off that must be considered in the overall design, and requires profiling of the regulated applications.

1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 We currently implement *MemPol* in software on one of the smaller real-time cores. However, the implementation is simple enough to be realized in hardware or in an FPGA. Compared to less flexible regulation approaches, (e.g., Arm CCI-400 [\(ARM,](#page-36-1) $2016b$, which uses counters to bound bursts), *MemPol* requires storage for the execution history in the last w polling periods. In order to implement regulation at OS task level, window sizes and budgets on each core should change dynamically. The current implementation of the regulator supports such dynamism by considering budget

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 updates in the next cycle of the control loop. However, penalties due to overshoot- ing in previous cycles cannot be eliminated. In this work, we have not evaluated the impact of dynamically changing the sliding window size w at run-time.

 approach as a valid solution for self-hosted debugging in the A53 and A72 manuals [\(ARM,](#page-37-2) [2018a,](#page-37-2) [2016c\)](#page-37-3). In our experiments, we did not observe any problems with, e.g., atomic synchronization or idle management of the cores. However, it is worth noting that debug interfaces and performance counters, in general, seem to be second class citizens w.r.t. safety features. For instance, the debug APB interface to CoreSight reg- isters lacks ECC on the R5 cores [\(ARM,](#page-36-2) [2011\)](#page-36-2), and PMCs are underspecified and may exhibit inaccuracies [\(Mezzetti et al.,](#page-40-5) [2018\)](#page-40-5), as evidenced by the slight under- counting in Sec. [5.1,](#page-16-2) or even presents bugs [\(ARM,](#page-37-4) [2019\)](#page-37-4). Two related questions are whether the right combination of PMU counters will be available on newer Arm core generations, considering that Arm introduces an L3 cache as LLC from the Cortex- A75 onwards [\(ARM,](#page-37-5) [2018b\)](#page-37-5), and if the access to the PMCs via the relatively slow CoreSight interface scales beyond a handful of cores. We defer the evaluation of both questions to future work. Currently, MemPol throttles cores via debug interfaces. Arm documents the

 systems to disable throttling in critical sections. An alternative to the debug interface to throttle cores would be using regulation interrupts and poll—from a light-weight interrupt handler—the end of the throttling phase in a status register of the regulator. Another possibility is to combine both mechanisms, e.g., use the debug interface to throttle cores for short blocking times and raise interrupts if longer blocking times are expected. This would allow an OS to handle interrupts during longer throttling phases, as incoming interrupts are queued in the interrupt controller when a core is halted in debug state and delivered when the core is released again. On Arm, the often unused FIQ interrupt would be a good candidate for interrupt-based throttling. While the ZCU102 platform provides means to send interrupts to the application cores from the R5 cores, we did not further evaluate this approach, as even a fast interrupt handler requires support from the operating system and causes memory accesses during execution. We leave as future work the evaluation of interrupt-based throttling and the fine-grained regulation at OS task-level. Finally, note that the lack of control mechanisms for an OS to disable throttling during critical sections and the 1552 inability to handle OS-level interrupts during throttling are shared by all MemGuard implementations at hypervisor level that we are aware of. Another limitation is that the debug interfaces provide no simple way for operating

 7 Related Work

 The problem of regulating memory interference on complex MPSoC platforms has received considerable attention and several software and hardware approaches have been proposed. While software-based approaches to memory regulation benefit from greater flexibility and are widely applicable to existing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) platforms, hardware-based approaches are capable of higher control resolu- tion and—given their vantage point view of the system—can precisely monitor and regulate memory traffic.

1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 On the software side, the initial work on PMC-based regulation $(MemGuard)$ [\(Yun](#page-43-0) [et al.,](#page-43-0) [2013;](#page-43-0) [Yun et al.,](#page-43-1) [2016\)](#page-43-1) has been followed by multiple studies [\(Modica et al.,](#page-39-1) [2018;](#page-39-1) [Dagieu et al.,](#page-38-2) [2016;](#page-38-2) [Martins et al.,](#page-40-6) [2020\)](#page-40-6), including implementations of MemGuard also at the hypervisor level to prevent modifications in the host OS, thus allowing for improved applicability. Notably, [Bechtel and Yun](#page-37-0) [\(2019\)](#page-37-0) extended the MemGuard implementation for Linux^{15} Linux^{15} Linux^{15} to support separate regulation on read (cache-refills) or write (write backs) memory traffic for each core. The work of [Bechtel and Yun](#page-37-6) [\(2023\)](#page-37-6) also extends MemGuard to regulate LLC bandwidth offering protection against Cache Bank-Aware Denial-of-Service Attacks.

1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 Performance counters can only provide an approximation of the load effectively generated on the interconnect and on the DRAM memory controller and the discrepancies between memory traffic generated by the CPUs and the utilization of the memory DRAM controller have been outlined by [Sohal et al.](#page-42-2) [\(2020\)](#page-42-2) and [Saeed et al.](#page-42-3) [\(2022\)](#page-42-3). In these works, actual memory utilization is determined via performance counters exposed by the memory-controller. Unfortunately, the internals of the memory controllers are rarely made available by hardware vendors [\(Rehm et al.,](#page-41-8) [2021\)](#page-41-8), and only a limited subset of MPSoCs (mostly from NXP, e.g., [\(NXP,](#page-40-7) [2024c\)](#page-41-1)) exposes some PMCs for the memory controller.

1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 The work by [Saeed et al.](#page-42-3) [\(2022\)](#page-42-3) shares similarities with ours as the memory utilization is periodically sampled. Nonetheless, standard MemGuard's interrupts—and associated overheads—are used to regulate cores and to trigger the sampling. The approach proposed by [Saeed et al.](#page-42-6) [\(2023\)](#page-42-6) also periodically samples PMCs to build distribution-driven memory regulation.

1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 In addition to PMCs, modern MPSoCs provide other QoS or monitoring features (e.g., [\(ARM,](#page-36-3) [2014\)](#page-36-3)). The work by [Garcia-Esteban et al.](#page-38-3) [\(2023\)](#page-38-3) have provided an in-depth analysis of ZCU102 QoS features and the works of [Sohal et al.](#page-42-2) [\(2020\)](#page-42-2); [Serrano-Cases et al.](#page-41-4) [\(2021\)](#page-41-4); [Houdek et al.](#page-39-2) [\(2017\)](#page-39-2); [Zini et al.](#page-43-3) [\(2022\)](#page-43-3) and [Garcia-Esteban](#page-38-3) [et al.](#page-38-3) [\(2023\)](#page-38-3) have exploited such primitives to implement bandwidth regulation. Although effective, integrated platform monitors and regulators, e.g., [ARM](#page-36-1) [\(2016b\)](#page-36-1), only offer a pre-defined set of regulation possibilities, and—since they monitor at the platform interconnect level—make it complex to attribute monitored traffic to specific cores [\(Sohal et al.,](#page-42-2) [2020\)](#page-42-2). In parallel to PMC-based regulation, other approaches [\(Agrawal et al.,](#page-36-4) [2017;](#page-36-4) [Flodin et al.,](#page-38-4) [2014\)](#page-38-4) base their regulation strategy on worst-case memory budget estimations derived with offline analysis of statically known workloads.

1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 1608 On the hardware side, to enable higher monitoring resolution, the works of [Zhou](#page-43-4) [and Wentzlaff](#page-43-4) [\(2016\)](#page-43-4) and [Farshchi et al.](#page-38-5) [\(2020\)](#page-38-5) develop custom hardware components to implement bandwidth regulation directly at hardware level, while [Cardona](#page-38-6) [et al.](#page-38-6) [\(2019\)](#page-38-6) implements an FPGA module to monitor and regulate different types of requests simultaneously. This proposal was also deployed on a prototype RISC-V design [\(Wessman et al.,](#page-42-7) [2021\)](#page-42-7). Adaptations for the memory controller have been proposed by [Mirosanlou et al.](#page-40-8) [\(2020\)](#page-40-8); [Hassan et al.](#page-39-3) [\(2017\)](#page-39-3); [Valsan and Yun](#page-42-8) [\(2015\)](#page-42-8); [Akesson et al.](#page-36-5) [\(2007\)](#page-36-5) and [Fernandez-De-Lecea et al.](#page-38-1) [\(2023\)](#page-38-1) to reduce the worst-case latency of memory requests under multicore contention. Time Division Multiplexing

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¹⁵[https://github.com/mbechtel2/memguard.](https://github.com/mbechtel2/memguard)

 hardware implementations have also been proposed by [Hebbache et al.](#page-39-4) [\(2018\)](#page-39-4); [Jun](#page-39-5) [et al.](#page-39-5) [\(2007\)](#page-39-5); [Li et al.](#page-39-6) [\(2016\)](#page-39-6) and [Kostrzewa et al.](#page-39-7) [\(2016\)](#page-39-7) to improve predictability of the memory interconnect level. On MPSoCs (e.g., [\(Xilinx,](#page-42-0) [2024b\)](#page-42-0)) that feature an on-chip programmable logic, [Hoornaert et al.](#page-39-8) [\(2021\)](#page-39-8) proposed an architecture to schedule individual memory transactions by redirecting CPU memory traffic through the FPGA, while an FPGA-based closed-loop controller is proposed by [Freitag and](#page-38-7) [Uhrig](#page-38-7) [\(2018\)](#page-38-7).

 RDT [\(Intel,](#page-39-9) [2024\)](#page-39-9) aim to deliver improved (QoS) control over the memory subsys- tem. Real-time characteristics of RDT are analyzed by [Sohal et al.](#page-41-9) [\(2022\)](#page-41-9) and a theoretical analysis of MPAM characteristics is presented by [Zini et al.](#page-43-5) [\(2023\)](#page-43-5). Unfor- tunately, the availability of such architectural-level features on current systems is still very limited. Furthermore, in the case of Arm MPAM, all its control interfaces are defined as optional and it is therefore unclear, which controls will be available in actual implementations. Architecture-level features such as Arm's MPAM [\(ARM,](#page-37-7) [2022a\)](#page-37-7) or Intel's

 [2013;](#page-40-9) [Xilinx,](#page-42-9) [2020;](#page-42-9) [Kloda et al.,](#page-39-10) [2019\)](#page-39-10) and bank-level partitioning [\(Yun et al.,](#page-43-6) [2014\)](#page-43-6) have been also successfully used to mitigate core-interference at cache and DRAM level respectively. Notably, hardware support for cache partitioning is offered on recent MPSoC such as NVIDIA's Jetson AGX Orin [\(NVIDIA,](#page-40-1) [2024a\)](#page-40-1) as part of Arm's DynamIQ [\(ARM,](#page-37-8) [2022b\)](#page-37-8). In addition to bandwidth regulation, cache partitioning techniques [\(Mancuso et al.,](#page-40-9)

 based boards is presented by [Capodieci et al.](#page-37-9) [\(2020\)](#page-37-9) and [Cavicchioli et al.](#page-37-10) [\(2017\)](#page-37-10), while [Brilli et al.](#page-37-11) [\(2022\)](#page-37-11) investigates memory interference for FPGA-based heteroge- neous MPSoCs. An empirical characterization of memory interference for different NVIDIA-

8 Conclusion

1639 We presented MemPol, a novel approach for bandwidth regulation of application cores 1640 in today's MPSoCs. MemPol enables low-overhead regulation by polling PMU coun- ters from an external processing unit—such as the R5 core on the Xilinx UltraScale+ ZCU102, the M4 core on the NXP i.MX8M or the M7 core on the NXP S32G2— throttles cores using on-chip debug facilities, and uses an on-off controller design with 1644 a sliding window technique to control burstiness. MemPol can regulate based on the simultaneous contribution of multiple PMU counters and provides a combination of per-core regulation and global regulation of all cores that allows redistributing unused bandwidth between cores, while keeping the overall memory bandwidth below a given global threshold.

 (1) has a more accurate cost model that considers multiple PMU counter for regula- tion, (2) does not generate timer or PMU interrupt overheads for application cores, and (3) employs a fine-grained microsecond-scale bandwidth regulation allows bet- ter cooperation with hardware-based QoS schemes, e.g., in the Arm CCI-400 [\(ARM,](#page-36-1) [2016b\)](#page-36-1), and prevents starvation of other bus-masters. Compared to state-of-the-art PMC-based regulations (e.g., MemGuard), MemPol:

1657 1658 1659 1660 The shown implementation focuses on per-core regulation, similar to MemGuard implementations found in hypervisors, but can be extended towards regulation at task level as well by including interrupt-based notification to the OS to enforce throttling. We leave an implementation of this for future work.

1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 The presented regulation mechanism is challenging in multiple ways. An on-offbased controller design has to cope with overshooting of memory budgets, delays in the control paths, and unknown behaviors of applications' memory access patterns at a microsecond scale. However, we see this work as a starting point for further research in regulation mechanisms from outside the cores.

Acknowledgments. The material presented in this paper is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under grant number CCF-2008799 and CNS-2238476. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the NSF.

Marco Caccamo was supported by an Alexander von Humboldt Professorship endowed by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.

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